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Abstract
We propose a model characterized by strategic interactions among
an endogenous number of producers and search and matching frictions
in the labor market. In line with U.S. data: (i) new ﬁrms account
for a relatively small share of overall employment, but they create a
relevant fraction of new jobs; (ii) ﬁrms’ entry is procyclical; (iii) price
mark ups are countercyclical, while aggregate proﬁts are procyclical. In
response to a technology shock the labor share decreases on impact and
overshoots its long run level. Also the propagation on labor market
variables is stronger than in the standard search model. We argue that
the countercyclicality of the price mark up is the key mechanism for our
results.
JEL classiﬁcation: E24, E32, L11.
Keywords: Endogenous Market Structures, Job Creation, Firms’ En-
try, Search and Matching Frictions.
11 Introduction
We present a framework where search and matching frictions in the
labor market interact with the dynamics of the number of ﬁrms and
their strategic behavior. Market structures are said to be endogenous
since the number of producers and the price mark ups are determined
both in the short and in the long run.
The paper is motivated by three stylized facts: the large fraction of
job creation (destruction) in the U.S. economy due to the birth (death)
of ﬁrms; the procyclical variation in the number of market competitors
and in aggregate proﬁts; the countercyclicality of price mark ups.1
To account for these facts we consider an economy with distinct sec-
tors, each one characterized by many ﬁrms supplying goods that can
be imperfectly substitutable to a diﬀerent extent. As in Jaimovich and
Floetotto (2008) and Colciago and Etro (2010 a and b), we take strate-
gic interactions into account and allow ﬁrms within a sector to compete
either in prices (Bertrand competition) or in quantities (Cournot com-
petition). Following Ghironi and Melitz (2005) and Bilbiie, Ghironi and
Melitz (2007) (BGM 2007 henceforth), entry is subject to sunk entry
costs and a time-to-build lag. The free entry condition equates the ex-
pected present discounted value of proﬁts to the sunk cost to endogenize
the number of ﬁrms in each sector. As a result the degree of market
power, measured as the mark up that ﬁrms can impose over marginal
costs, depends endogenously on the form of competition, on the degree of
substitutability between goods and on the number of ﬁrms in the sector.
Firms are large, since they employ multiple-workers and the labor
market is characterized by Mortensen and Pissarides (1999)-style search
and matching frictions. Workers may separate from a job for two, exoge-
nous, reasons: either because the ﬁrm where the job is located exits from
the market or because the match is destroyed. The endogeneity of the
number of producers together with the large ﬁrms assumption allows to
characterize both the intensive and the extensive margin of job creation,
and to realistically distinguish between the dynamics of the number of
producers and that of employment.
Beside addressing the empirical facts mentioned above we use this
setup to show two further results. First the model reproduces the co-
movement of labor share with technology shocks at business cycle fre-
quencies. Rios-Rull and Santaeulàlia-Llopis (2010) estimate the response
of the labor share, i.e. the ratio of the labor compensation to output, to
1We discuss empirical evidence supporting these facts below. Notice that, as in
Jaimovich and Floetotto (2008), we use the terms new ﬁrms and new competitors in
a broad sense. They refer to both start ups and to new establishments.
2a technology shocks in the US economy, and ﬁnd that it is characterized
by two main features: countercyclicality and overshooting. Explaining
both these facts is a notorious diﬃculty for conventional business cy-
cle models.2 Second we show that under a conservative and standard
calibration, our framework outperforms the basic search and matching
model at replicating the observed variability of the unemployment rate,
vacancies and market tightness.
The mechanism at the basis of both results is the markup counter-
cyclicality due to oligopolistic competition between ﬁrms. A positive
technology shock promotes entry of new ﬁrms. The resulting stronger
competition leads to a persistent decrease in the price mark up. In
particular, when productivity increases the markup is muted on impact
and gradually decreases as the goods market gets more crowded. A lower
price markup leads to a persistent increase in the value of the marginal
product of labor, thereby aﬀecting the dynamic of the real wage. In par-
ticular following a technology shock the latter peaks after some periods,
when the mark up reaches its minimum, and then reverts to the steady
state with a hump shape dynamics. On the contrary, output jumps on
impact and then monotonically reverts to the steady state. As a result
of the hump shaped response of the real wage, labor income peaks while
output is decreasing, leading to the overshooting of the labor share.
Turning to the ampliﬁcation result, a persistently lower mark up, by
increasing the value of the current and future marginal product of labor,
boosts hiring both at the intensive and the extensive margin. The eﬀect
of technology shocks on unemployment is thus ampliﬁed with respect to
what happens in a model with constant mark ups and a constant number
of producers.
Notice that a similar propagation mechanism based on markup coun-
tercyclicality holds in sticky-prices environment, as emphasized by Mona-
celli et al. (2010). However, in our framework although markups are
countercyclical, aggregate proﬁts remain strongly procyclical as in the
data. BGM (2010) point out that it is notoriously diﬃcult to generate
both countercyclical markups and procyclical aggregate proﬁts in mod-
els with sticky prices, or, more generally, in any model economy with a
constant number of ﬁrms.
In the long run stronger competition in the goods market leads to
lower unemployment and to higher real wages. The endogenous steady
state share of gross job creation due to new ﬁrms is 25 percent and the
share of overall employment due to startups equals 2.5 percent. These
2Choi and Rios-Rull (2009) analyze real business cycles models where wages are
not set competitively and show that none of these models is able to reproduce the
labor share overshooting.
3ﬁgures are in line with U.S. averages. Haltiwanger et al. (2009) con-
sider U.S. annual data between 1992 and 2005. They ﬁnd that business
startups account for roughly 3 percent of U.S. total employment in any
given year. While this is a reasonably small share of the stock, it is large
relative to net job creation which averages around 2.2 percent of total
employment per year.3 Also, Davis and Haltiwanger (1990) on the ba-
sis of U.S. manufacturing data between 1972 and 1986 estimate that 25
percent of annual gross job creation is due to new establishments births.
Similarly, Jaimovich and Floetotto (2008) focus on employment data at
the establishment level. They estimate that the average fraction of quar-
terly job-gain (losses) that can be explained by the opening (closing) of
establishments is about 20 percent.
What does the empirical evidence have to say about the procycli-
cality of ﬁrms’ entry and the countercyclicality of price markups? An
early reference on the procyclicality of ﬁrms’ entry in the U.S. is Chat-
terjee and Cooper (1993), while a more recent one is Bergin and Corsetti
(2008).
The main challenge when trying to measure the cyclicality of price
mark ups is the lack of a direct measure of marginal costs. For this
reason authors have to make assumptions concerning the relationship
between marginal and average costs. As a consequence, the evidence
concerning the cyclicality of price mark ups is more controversial than
that on ﬁrms’ entry. Nekarda and Ramey (2010), using average wages
and other measures to proxy marginal costs, support the view that mark
ups are acyclical. Their result is challenged by Cheremuklin and Tutino
(2011), who, using the same data constructed by Nekarda and Ramey
(2011), ﬁnd support for mark ups countercyclicality. Cheremuklin and
Tutino (2011) suggest that the acyclicality result may depend on the
speciﬁc detrending procedure adopted.4 Bils (1987), Rotemberg and
Woodford (2000) and Galì et al. (2007) also document price mark up
countercyclicality.5
3Haltiwanger et al (2009) warn that it would be misleading to conclude that new
ﬁrms account for more than 100% percent of all net new jobs. Other, mature, ﬁrms
are creating jobs. However the net growth from new ﬁrms alone exceeds the average.
4Cheremukhin and Tutino (2011) use the series on private sector mark ups con-
structerd by Nekarda and Ramey (2010) and argue that mark ups are countercyclical.
They suggest that cyclicality results may depend on the speciﬁc detrending procedure
adopted. To avoid this issue Cheremuklin and Tutino (2010) compute mark up cycli-
cality resorting to the third moment of ﬁrst diﬀerenced data, which is independent
of the detrending procedure.
5More in detail, Bils (1987) estimates marginal cost in U.S. manufacturing un-
der several assumptions about overtime and adjustment costs and concludes that
markups are countercyclical. Rotemberg and Woodford (2000) discuss several reasons
for which mark ups should be countercyclical. Galì et al. (2007) use VAR analysis
4A relevant empirical support to our model comes from the studies
by Campbell and Hopenayn (2005) and Oliveira Martins and Scarpetta
(1999). These papers convincingly report evidence suggesting that a
variation in the number of competitors aﬀects the degree of competition
in the market and through this way the mark up that ﬁrms can impose
on marginal costs. Finally, BGM (2007) and Etro and Colciago (2010)
emphasize the procyclicality of real proﬁts.
Overall, the evidence brieﬂy discussed tends to favour countercyclical
theories of mark ups and to support the view that competition between
an endogenous number of producers is a relevant dimension to consider
in order to understand the connection between labor markets and the
goods markets. To conclude, to our knowledge, the model we propose is
the ﬁrst one to address in a uniﬁed framework the stylized facts listed
at the beginning of this Introduction.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy
reviews the relevant literature. Section 3 spells out the model economy.
Section 4 contains the main results and Section 5 concludes. Technical
details are left in the Appendix.
2 Related Literature
The papers closest related to ours are Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003),
Hebel and Haefke (2009), Shao and Silos (2008) and more recently
Acemoglu and Hawkins (2010), Hawkins (2011) and Kaas and Kircher
(2011).
With respect to Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) we provide a fully
speciﬁed DSGE model where the dynamics of the number of ﬁrms is
explicitly modeled. Hebel and Haefke (2009) consider a labor search
model with ﬁrms’ entry. However, their analysis focuses on the long
run eﬀects of deregulation in the goods markets for the level of unem-
ployment and the real wage. Shao and Silos (2008) introduce ﬁrms’ entry
in a Mortensen-Pissarides-style model with monopolistic competition in
the goods market. Their framework is characterized by small ﬁrms and
constant mark ups. They identify the countercyclical value of vacancies
as the main propagation channel of technology shocks. Also, the small
ﬁrms assumption does not allow to address the empirical evidence on
job creation by new entrants.
Acemoglu and Hawkins (2010) consider a model with large ﬁrms,
decreasing returns to labor and an extensive margin of job creation due
to ﬁrms’ entry. They assume convex costs of adjusting the labor force
to document the countercyclicality of price mark ups in response to an expansionary
monetary policy shock. Colciago and Etro (2010) use the same multivariate technique
to show mark up countercyclicality in response to a positive technology shock.
5at the ﬁrm level. Decreasing return to labor together with continuous
wage bargaining deliver heterogeneity in the size of ﬁrms. They ﬁnd
that size heterogeneity implies responses of unemployment and of the
job market tightness to a shock to labor productivity which are signiﬁ-
cantly more persistent than in the Mortensen-Pissarides model. Hawkins
(2011), however, argues that the heterogeneity in the size of ﬁrms is not
enough to strengthen the propagation of shocks. More precisely, he
shows that the assumption at the basis of the ampliﬁcation in Acemoglu
and Hawkins (2010) is the convex cost schedule that ﬁrms face when
they adjust their labor force. This slows down the job creation process
at the ﬁrm level, leading to an aggregate sluggish dynamics. Notice that
in our framework the slow response of the number of ﬁrms does not lead
to propagation per se, but due to its eﬀect on the price mark up.
Our analysis diﬀers from that in Kaas and Kircher (2011) with re-
spect to both assumptions and focus. For what concerns assumptions
we feature strategic interactions among large ﬁrms which bargaining the
wage on a period-by-period basis with their employees. The aforemen-
tioned authors consider an alternative framework to characterize ﬁrms’
dynamics in a frictional labor market, where large, risk-neutral ﬁrms
can commit to long-term wage contracts. With respect to the focus,
we analyze endogenous market structures both in the long and the short
run, and we emphasize their role under diﬀerent forms of competition for
the propagation of exogenous technology shocks on labor market vari-
ables. Kaas and Kircher (2011) focus instead on the eﬃciency of the
competitive equilibrium in the presence of multiple-workers ﬁrms that
can commit to long-term wage contracts.
3 The model
3.1 Labor and Goods Markets
There are two main building blocks in the model: oligopolistic competi-
tion with endogenous entry in the goods market and search and matching
frictions in the labor market. In this paragraph we outlay their main
features.
As in Colciago and Etro (2010 a and b), the economy features a
continuum of sectors, or industries, on the unit interval. Sectors are
indexed with k ∈ (0,1). Each sector k is characterized by diﬀerent ﬁrms
i = 1,2,...,Nkt producing the same good in diﬀerent varieties. At the
beginning of each period Ne
kt new ﬁrms enter into sector k, while at the
end of the period a fraction δ ∈ (0,1) of market participants exits from
the market for exogenous reasons.6 Below we describe the entry process
6As discussed in BGM (2007), if macroeconomic shocks are small enough Ne
kt is
6and the mode of competition within in each sector in detail.
The labor market is characterized by search and matching frictions,
as in Andolfatto (1996) and Mertz (1995). A fraction ut of the unit
mass population is unemployed at time t and searches for a job. Firms
producing at time t need to post vacancies in order to hire new workers.
Unemployed workers and vacancies combine according to a CRS match-
ing function and deliver mt new hires, or matches, in each period. The




t, where γm reﬂects the
eﬃciency of the matching process, vtot
t is the total number of vacancies
created at time t and ut is the unemployment rate. The probability that
a ﬁrm ﬁlls a vacancy is given by qt = mt
vtot
t , while the probability to ﬁnd
a job for an unemployed worker reads as zt = mt
ut . Firms and individu-
als take both probabilities as given. Matches become productive in the
same period in which they are formed. Each ﬁrm separates exogenously
from a fraction 1 − ̺ of existing workers each period, where ̺ is the
probability that a worker stays with a ﬁrm until the next period.
As a result a worker may separate from a job for two reasons: ei-
ther because the ﬁrm where the job is located exits from the market or
because the match is destroyed. Since these sources of separation are
independent, the evolution of aggregate employment, Lt, is given by
Lt = (1 − δ)̺Lt−1 + mt (1)
where the number of unemployed workers searching for a job at time t
is ut = 1 − Lt−1.7
3.2 Households and Firms
Using the family construct of Mertz (1995) we can refer to a represen-
tative household consisting of a continuum of individuals of mass one.
Members of the household insure each other against the risk of being














χ,ϕ ≥ 0 (2)
where β ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor and the variable ht represents
individual hours worked. Note that Ckt is a consumption index for a set
positive in every period. New entrants ﬁnance entry on the stock market.
7Given that population is normalized to one, the number of unemployed workers
and the unemployment rate are identical.











where Ckt(i) is the production of ﬁrm i of this sector, and ε > 1 is the
elasticity of substitution between the goods produced in each sector. The
distinction between diﬀerent sectors and diﬀerent goods within a sector
allows to realistically separate limited substitutability at the aggregated
level, and high substitutability at the disaggregated level. Contrary
to many macroeconomic models with imperfect competition, our focus
will be on the market structure of disaggregated sectors: intrasectoral
substitutability (between goods produced by ﬁrms of a same sector) is
high, while intersectoral substitutability is low.8 The family receives
real labor income wthtLt and proﬁts from the ownership of ﬁrms. Fur-
ther, we assume that unemployed individuals receive an unemployment
beneﬁt b in real terms, leading to an overall beneﬁt for the household
equal to b(1 − Lt). This is ﬁnanced through lump sum taxation by the
government. Notice that the household recognizes that employment is
determined by the ﬂows of its members into and out of employment
according to
Lt = (1 − δ)̺Lt−1 + ztut (4)
Households choose how much to save in riskless bonds and in the creation
of new ﬁrms through the stock market according to standard Euler and
asset pricing equations.9
The intratemporal optimality conditions for the optimal choices of
Ckt requires:
PktCkt = EXPt for any k (5)
where EXPt is total nominal expenditure allocated to the goods pro-
duced in each sector in period t and Pkt is the price index for consumption
in sector k: due to the unitary elasticity of substitution, total expendi-
ture is identical across sectors.
8Our functional form implies unitary elasticity of substitution between goods pro-
duced in diﬀerent sectors. In this case the aggregate consumption bundle enjoyed
by the household could be deﬁned as CA
t = exp




the aggregate price index PA
t = exp
   1
0 lnPktdk
 
. The same approach has been
proposed by Colciago and Etro (2010 a). Atkeson and Burnstein (2008) consider a
trade model with multiple sectors. Even if they allow for general substitutability
across sectors, their numerical results are obtained assuming a unitary intersectoral
elasticity of substitution.
9We report these conditions in Appendix A.
8Each ﬁrm i in sector k produces a good with a linear production
function. We abstract from capital accumulation issues and assume that
labor is the only input. Output of ﬁrm i in sector k is then:
ykt(i) = Atnkt (i)hkt(i) (6)
where At is the, common to all sectors, total factor productivity at time
t, nkt (i) is ﬁrm i’s time t workforce and hkt(i) represent hours per em-
ployee. Since each sector can be characterized in the same way, in what
follows we will drop the index k and refer to the representative sector.10
Finally, the marginal value to the household of having one member
employed rather than unemployed, Γt, which is a determinant of the









+ βEt [(1 − δ)ρ − zt+1]Γt+1 (7)
where Ct is individual consumption.
3.3 Endogenous Market Structures
Following Ghironi and Melitz (2005) and BGM (2007) we assume that
new entrants at time t will only start producing at time t + 1. Given
the exogenous exit probability δ, the average number of ﬁrms per sector,
Nt, follows the equation of motion:




t is the average number of new entrants at time t. We assume
that entry requires a ﬁxed cost ψ, which is measured in units of output.
In each period, the same nominal expenditure for each sector EXPt





























10We provide analytical details in Appendix A.














i = 1,2,...,Nt (11)
Period t real proﬁts of an incumbent producer are deﬁned as
πt (i) = ρt (i)yt (i) − wt (i)nt (i)ht (i) − κvt (i) (12)
where ρt (i) (=
pt(i)
Pt ) is the real price of ﬁrm i’s output, vt (i) represents
the number of vacancies posted at time t and κ is the output cost of
keeping a vacancy open. The value of a ﬁrm is the expected discounted
value of its future proﬁts









is the households’ stochastic discount
factor which takes into account that ﬁrms’ survival probability is 1 −
δ. Incumbent ﬁrms which do not exit from the market have a time t
individual workforce given by
nt (i) = ̺nt−1 (i) + vt (i)qt (14)
3.3.1 Bertrand Competition
Let us consider competition in prices. Contrary to the traditional Dixit-
Stiglitz approach which neglects strategic interactions between ﬁrms, we
take these into consideration and derive the exact Bertrand equilibrium.
Each ﬁrm i chooses pt(i), nt (i) and vt (i) to maximize πt (i) + Vt (i),
taking as given the price of the other ﬁrms. Maximization is subject to
three constraints, namely (6), (9) and (14).
The variable φt (i) is the Lagrange multiplier of the latter constraint,
and represents the time-t value of an additional workers to the ﬁrm;
mct (i) is the time t real marginal cost faced by ﬁrm i and represents
the Lagrange multiplier of constraint (6).
11The demand of the individual good and the price index are the solution to the,
usual, consumption expenditure minimization problem.
10In what follows we distinguish between incumbent ﬁrms according
to their period of entry. We deﬁne as ﬁrst period incumbent ﬁrms those
producers which entered the market in period t-1 and at time t produce
for the ﬁrst time. The term mature incumbent ﬁrms refers, instead, to
producers which entered the market in period t-2 or prior. The distinc-
tion is relevant because ﬁrst period incumbents have no beginning of
period workforce. Nevertheless, Proposition 1 and 2 show that in both
the Bertrand and Cournot equilibria incumbent producers, no matter
the period of entry, have the same size, impose the same mark up over
marginal costs and have the same individual level of production.
Proposition 1 (Bertrand Equilibrium) In the Bertrand equilibrium,
no matter the period of entry: i) the marginal cost and the value of
an additional worker are identical across producers: mct (i) = mct and





ε(Nt − 1) + 1
(ε − 1)(Nt − 1)
(15)
iii) ﬁrms have the same level of production, the same size and demand
the same number of hours per employee: yt (i) = yt, nt (i) = nt and
ht (i) = ht.
Proof. See Appendix B1
Since in equilibrium ﬁrms set the same prices, it follows from (10)






t . The mark up  P
t (ε,Nt) is decreasing in the
degree of substitutability between products ε, with an elasticity ǫP
ε =
εNt
(1−ε+εNt)(ε−1). Moreover, the mark up vanishes in case of perfect sub-
stitutability: limε→∞  P(ε,Nt) = 1. Finally, the mark up is decreasing
in the number of ﬁrms, with an elasticity ǫP
N = Nt
(1+ε(Nt−1))(Nt−1). Notice
that the elasticity of the mark up to entry under competition in prices is
decreasing in the level of substitutability between goods, and it tends to
zero when the goods are approximately homogenous. When Nt → ∞ the
mark up tends to ε/(ε−1), the traditional one under monopolistic com-
petition. As well known, strategic interactions between a ﬁnite number
of ﬁrms lead to a higher mark up than under monopolistic competition.
3.3.2 Cournot Competition
In this section we consider competition in quantities, which has been
largely neglected in general equilibrium macroeconomic models with im-
perfect competition. In this case ﬁrms maximize πt + Vt choosing their
production yt(i) beside nt (i) and vt (i), taking as given the production
11of the other ﬁrms. Maximization is subject to the same constraints as
above, taking care to replace the direct demand function (9) with the
inverse demand function given by equation (11). Most of the considera-
tions drawn in the Bertrand competition case extend to Cournot compe-
tition. Proposition 2 fully characterizes the equilibrium under Cournot
competition.
Proposition 2 (Cournot Equilibrium) Points i),iii) and iii) of Propo-
sition 1 extend to the Cournot case. The symmetric Cournot equilibrium















(ε − 1)(Nt − 1)
(17)
Proof. See Appendix B2.
For a given number of ﬁrms, the mark up under competition in quan-
tities is always larger than the one obtained under competition in prices,
as well known for models of product diﬀerentiation (see for instance
Vives 1999). Notice that the mark up is decreasing in the degree of sub-
stitutability between products ε, with an elasticity ǫQ
ε = 1/(ε−1), which
is always smaller than ǫP
ε : higher substitutability reduces mark ups faster
under competition in prices. In the Cournot equilibrium, the mark up
remains positive for any degree of substitutability, since even in the case
of homogenous goods, we have limε→∞  Q(ε,Nt) = Nt/(Nt − 1). This
allow us to consider the eﬀect of strategic interactions in an otherwise
standard setup with perfect substitute goods within sectors (as in the
standard RBC setting with search and matching frictions of Andolfatto
(1996) and Mertz (1995)).
In the general formulation the mark up is decreasing and convex in
the number of ﬁrms with elasticity ǫ
Q
N = 1/(N−1), which is decreasing in
the number of ﬁrms (the mark up decreases with entry at an increasing




N for any number of ﬁrms or degree of substitutability, we
can conclude that entry decreases mark ups faster under competition in
quantities compared to competition in prices, a result that will have an
impact on the relative behavior of the economy under the two forms of
competition. Only when Nt → ∞ the mark up tends to ε/(ε−1), which
is the traditional mark up under monopolistic competition.12
12In what follows, to lighten the notation, we suppress the dependance of ρt and




t be, respectively, the real proﬁts and the number of
vacancies posted by a ﬁrst period incumbent. Symmetrically, πt and
vt deﬁne, respectively, the individual proﬁts and vacancies posted by
mature incumbent ﬁrms.
Proposition 3 (Proﬁts and hiring policy) Under both Bertrand and
Cournot competition it follows that: i) vFP
t = nt




t = πt − κ̺
nt−1
qt .
Proof. See Appendix B3.
Since all incumbent ﬁrms are characterized by the same size, the op-
timal hiring policy of ﬁrst period incumbent ﬁrms, which have no initial
workforce, consists in posting at time t as many vacancies as required to
reach the size of a mature incumbent producer. Given vacancy posting
is costly, they will suﬀer lower proﬁts.
As a consequence of their hiring policy, ﬁrst period incumbent pro-
ducers grow faster and pay fewer dividends with respect to mature in-
cumbent producers. The ﬁrst result is consistent with the U.S. empirical
evidence in Haltiwanger et al. (2009), which suggests that a start-up
creates on average more new jobs than an incumbent ﬁrm, while the
second one is consistent with the evidence on the ﬁnancial behavior of
ﬁrms discussed by Cooley and Quadrini (2001).
3.3.4 Endogenous Entry
In each period the level of entry is determined endogenously to equate
the value of a new entrant, V e
t , to the entry cost
V
e
t = ψ (18)
The next Proposition provides a useful relationship between the value
of a new entrant and the value of an incumbent ﬁrm, denoted by Vt.
Proposition 4 (Value of an Incumbent Firm) The value of an in-







Proof. See Appendix B4.
Perspective new entrants have lower value than incumbent ﬁrms be-
cause they will have, in case they do not exit from the market before
starting production, to set up a workforce in their ﬁrst period of activity.
The diﬀerence in the value between an incumbent producer and a new
entrant is, in fact, the discounted value of the higher vacancy posting
cost that the latter will suﬀer, with respect to the former, in the ﬁrst
period of activity.
133.4 Bargaining over Wages and Hours
We assume Nash wage bargaining, so that the ﬁrm and each worker split
the joint surplus of their employment relationship. Thus, the real wage




Recall that the term in the ﬁrst bracket is the value to the ﬁrm of
having an additional worker, the second term is the household’s surplus
expressed in units of consumption. The parameter η reﬂects the parties’
relative bargaining power. The FOC for Nash bargaining is
ηφt = (1 − η)ΓtCt (21)
Using the deﬁnitions of φt and Γt gives, after some manipulations, the
wage equation













































Clearly the mark up function,  t, diﬀers according to the form of compe-
tition, whether Bertrand or Cournot. In both cases, however, the direct





 tAt represents the marginal revenue product (MRP) of la-
bor, while η represents the share of the MRP which goes to workers. As
described above, entry leads to an increase in the MRP of labor. Thus,
ceteris paribus, stronger competition shifts the wage curve up. This
result is similar to that in Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), who ﬁnd a
positive eﬀect of competition on the real wage.
Hours are set to maximize the joint surplus of the match, given by







where, as above,  t depends on the form of competition. Hours worked
are such that the the marginal rate of substitution between hours and
consumption equals the MRP of labor. Stronger competition leads to an
increase in hours bargained between the workers and ﬁrms for the same
reasons for which competition positively aﬀects the wage schedule.
143.5 Job Creation and Ampliﬁcation
Combining the ﬁrst conditions for proﬁts maximization we get the Job
















The JCC equates the real marginal cost of hiring a worker, the left
hand side, with the marginal beneﬁt, the right hand side. Note that we
assumed that ﬁrms take individual wages as given when choosing em-
ployment.13 Importantly, the marginal beneﬁt depends positively on the
ratio
ρt
 t, which is a positive function of the number of ﬁrms in the mar-
ket, Nt.14 As the number of competitors increases, agents consume more
goods and enjoy higher welfare for any given level of nominal expendi-
ture. For this reason the welfare based price level must decrease and the
relative price of variety i increases. This increases the proﬁtability of
the marginal worker. At the same time, stronger competition leads to a
lower mark up, stimulating demand by consumers and thereby increasing
output.
As we show below, a positive technology shock leads to entry of new
ﬁrms and thus to an increase in
ρt
 t. In equilibrium, since hiring depends
on the current and expected future values of the marginal product of
labor, this boosts hiring and employment.15
Notice that a similar propagation mechanism based on markup coun-
tercyclicality holds in sticky-prices environment, as emphasized by Mona-
celli et al. (2010). However, in our framework although markups are
countercyclical, aggregate proﬁts remain strongly procyclical as in the
data. BGM (2010) point out that it is notoriously diﬃcult to generate
both countercyclical markups and procyclical aggregate proﬁts in mod-
els with sticky prices, or, more generally, in any model economy with a
constant number of producers.
13A similar assumption can be found, inter alia, in chapter 3 of Pissarides (2000)
and Krause and Lubik (2007). This assumption rules out the the hiring externality
emphasized by Ebell and Haefke (2009). However, the same authors show that the
over-hiring eﬀect on unemployment and wages is quantitatively very small.
14Of course, µt diﬀers according to the mode of competition.
15The love for variety dimension is not essential for our results. Normalizing the
size of the product space leads to minor qualitative and quantitative changes to our
results. The essential dimension is that of the countercyclical mark up.
153.6 Aggregation and Market Clearing
Considering that the individual workforce, nt, is identical across produc-
ers leads to
Lt = ntNt (26)




further given ρt =
pt
Pt and the individual production function it follows
that
Yt = ρtNtyt = ρtAtLtht (27)
Aggregating the budget constraints of households we obtain the ag-
gregate resource constraint of the economy
Ct + ψN
e
t = WthtLt + Πt (28)
which states that the sum of consumption and investment in new en-
trants must equal the sum between labor income and aggregate proﬁts,
Πt, distributed to households at time t. Aggregate proﬁts are deﬁned as
Πt = (1 − δ)Nt−1πt + [Nt − (1 − δ)Nt−1]π
NP
t (29)
where (1 − δ)Nt−1 is the number of mature incumbent producers, and
Nt − (1 − δ)Ne
t−1 is the number of time-t ﬁrst period incumbent ﬁrms.
Goods’ market clearing requires
Yt = Ct + N
E
t ψ + κv
tot
t (30)
Finally, the dynamics of aggregate employment reads as
Lt = (1 − δ)̺Lt−1 + qtv
tot
t (31)
which shows that workers employed to a ﬁrm which exits the market join
the mass of unemployed. Appendix C lists the full set of equilibrium
conditions for the economy.
3.7 Steady State and Calibration
In order to obtain values for the steady state levels of variables and for
the deep structural parameters, we need to impose 14 restrictions. Cali-
bration is conducted on a quarterly basis. The discount factor, β, is set
to the standard value of 0.99 for quarterly data, while the rate of business
destruction, δ, equals 0.025 to match the U.S. empirical level of 10 per-
cent business destruction a year reported by BGM (2007). The baseline
value for the entry cost is set to match the U.S. ratio of investment equal
16to 15 per cent as in BGM (2007). This allows both models to hit the
same steady state markup, equal to 27 percent. Notice that this value
is within the range estimated by Oliveira Martins and Scarpetta (1999)
for a large number of U.S. manufacturing sectors. The implied values of
the entry cost are ψ = 1.69 under Bertrand competition and ψ = 0.48
under Cournot competition.16 With no loss of generality, the value of χ
is such that steady state labor supply equals one. In this case the Frisch
elasticity of labor supply reduces to ϕ, to which we assign a value of
one as in Monacelli et al. (2010). We take as the baseline value for the
intersectoral elasticity of substitution ε = 6, as estimated by Christiano,
Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) using U.S. quarterly data between 1965
and 1995. Technology is assumed to follow a ﬁrst order autoregressive
process given by ˆ At = ρA ˆ At−1+εAt, where ˆ At = ln(At/A) and ρA ∈ (0,1)
and εAt is a white noise disturbance, with zero expected value and stan-
dard deviation σA. As standard in the literature we set the steady state
marginal productivity of labor, A, to 1. As in BGM (2007) and King
and Rebelo (2000) we set ρa = 0.979 and σa = 0.0072.
Next we turn to parameters that are speciﬁc to the search and match-
ing framework. We adopt a conventional parameterization. The aggre-
gate separation rate is 1 − (1 − δ)̺. We set ̺ such that the the latter
equals 0.1, as suggested by estimates provided by Hall (1995) and Davis
et al. (1996). The elasticity of matches to unemployment is γ = 1
2,
which is within the range of the plausible values of 0.5 to 0.7 reported
by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) in their survey of the literature on
the estimation of the matching function. In the baseline parameteriza-
tion we impose symmetry in bargaining and set η = 1
2, as in the bulk
of the literature. We then set the the eﬃciency parameter in matching,
γm, and the steady state job market tightness to target an average job
ﬁnding rate, z, equal to 0.7 and a vacancy ﬁlling rate, q, equal to 0.9.
We draw the latter value from Andolfatto (1996) and Dee Haan et al.
(2000), while the former from Blanchard and Galì (2010). Notice that a
job ﬁnding rate equal to 0.7 corresponds, approximately, to a monthly
rate of 0.3, consistent with US evidence. Finally, we set the unemploy-
ment beneﬁt in real terms, b, such that the replacement ratio b
w equals
16We also sperimented with an alternative calibration strategy of this parameter.
We ﬁxed ψ = 1 and held it constant across market structures. In this case diﬀerent
market structures lead to diﬀerent values of the steady state great ratios and markups.
Given a common entry cost, the Bertrand equilibrium is characterized by a lower
number of goods compared to the Cournot equilibrium.
Not surprisingly a lower entry cost would be, in both frameworks, associated to
a higher number of producers and thus to stronger competition and, a lower mark
up and a higher real wage. However, the impulse response functions below are not
qualitatively aﬀected by the value of ψ.
170.48. This value is consistent with the US replacement ratio reported
in the OECD Economic Outlook of 1996 for the US.17 Given these pa-
rameters we can recover the cost of posting a vacancy κ by equating
the steady state version of the JCC and the steady state wage setting
equation.
The steady state rate of unemployment is equal to
u =
1 − (1 − δ)̺
qθ + (1 − (1 − δ)̺)
= 0.125
which is increasing in the rate, δ, of business destruction and in the
exogenous, ﬁrm-level job separation rate, ̺. As expected the unem-
ployment rate is decreasing in the job ﬁlling probability q. While the
endogenous steady state rate of unemployment is larger that the average
quarterly rate for the U.S., it is in line with the value used by Krause
and Lubik (2007) and much lower that those in Andolfatto (1996) and
Trigari (2009).18 Notice that the steady state ratio between jobs created













which implies that job creation by new producers account for about 25
per cent of total (gross) job creation, close to the quarterly U.S. average
of 20 per cent reported by Jaimovich and Floetotto (2008). Also notice
that the ratio between workers employed by ﬁrst period incumbent ﬁrms




(1 − δ)Ne L
N
L
= δ = 0.025
New producers account for about 2.5 percent of total employment, slightly
lower than the 3 percent reported by Haltiwanger et al. (2010) as the
average value for the U.S. between 1976 and 2005. Notice that the shares
considered are independent of both the entry cost and the competitive
framework.
17See Chapter 3 table 3.2. The OECD computes two distinct replacement ratio
concepts. The ﬁrst one is the Replacement Ratio at the beginning of the unemploy-
ment spell (54% for the U.S.). The second one is the average replacement ratio over
a 60 months unemployment spell (36% for the U.S.).
18The computation of the steady state is in Appendix D.
184 Business Cycle Analysis
In what follows we will ﬁrst study the impulse response functions to a
technology shock, and ﬁnally we will evaluate the second order moments.
To assess the role of endogenous market structures, we compare the per-
formance of the Bertrand and Cournot model to that of a standard search
model à la Shimer (2005), augmented with monopolistic competition in
the goods market. Thus, we consider a search model featuring a Cobb-
Douglas production function of the form yt = Atka
t−1 (Ltht)
1−α and a
dynamics of physical capital given by kt = (1 − δ)kt−1 + Ik
t , where Ik
t
represents investment in physical capital. As in the bulk of the literature
we set δ = 0.025 and α = 1
3.
The calibration strategy of remaining parameters is identical across
the models. Importantly, monopolistic competition implies that the
price mark up is exogenous. Firms do not interact strategically but
set a constant mark up over marginal costs equal to   = ε
ε−1.19
4.1 IRFs to a technology Shock
In this section we show the qualitative reactions of the economy to a
persistent technology shock. Figure 1 and Figure 2 depict percentage
deviations from the steady state of key variables in response to a one
standard deviation technology shock. Time on the horizontal axis is in
quarters. Solid lines refer to the case with competition in prices, dashed
lines to that with competition in quantities, dotted lines refer to the
benchmark search model.
Consider our baseline economy with endogenous entry. As shown in
Figure 1 and Figure 2, the model dynamics shows very similar pattern
under both Bertrand and Cournot competition. The shock increases
consumption and creates expectations of future proﬁts. This, in turn,
leads to entry of new ﬁrms.
Recall that entry is subject to a one period time-to-build lag, which
implies that the number of producing ﬁrms, Nt, does not change on
impact. This translates into an initially muted response of both the love
for variety and the mark up. In particular, the price mark up ﬁnds its
negative peak after few periods and then gradually reverts to its long run
value.20 As pointed out in the discussion of equation (25), an increase in
19We say that the markup is exogenous in the case of monopolistic competition
because its value is fully determined once the elasitcity of substitution between goods
is ﬁxed. In other words the two magnitudes cannot be set independently. Given
that our baseline calibration features ε = 6, the markup characterizing the benchmark
search model is ﬁxed at 20 percent.
20This correlation pattern is consistent with the analysis of prices and costs in
Rotemberg and Woodford (2000) and with the VAR evidence for the U.S. in Colciago
19the ratio
ρt
 t raise the current and future value of the marginal product
of labor, boosting vacancy creation and hiring.
As a result, under endogenous market structures the response of un-
employment , the job ﬁnding rate and the vacancy ﬁlling rate are ampli-
ﬁed with respect to those obtained in the benchmark search model. The
peak eﬀect on vacancy creation, however, is on impact because hiring is
a forward looking phenomenon.
Hall (2005) argues that the job ﬁnding rate is the key variable in
understanding the large ﬂuctuation in unemployment over the past 50
years. The strongly procyclical response of the job ﬁnding rate delivered
by the Bertrand and Cournot models is at the basis of the large swing
in unemployment. The endogeneity of the market structures implies a
response of the unemployment rate in the period after the shock which
is almost six times larger, and more persistent, than that observed in the
benchmark search model. Further, ﬂuctuation in output, labor market
tightness and aggregate hours remain larger in our baseline model than
in the benchmark search model.
While the shock vanishes and entry strengthens competition, output
and proﬁts of the ﬁrms drop and the incentives to enter disappear. At
some point net exit from the market occurs and the rate of unemploy-
ment, the mark up and thus the incentive to create vacancy gradually
return to the steady state. Importantly, our framework delivers procycli-
cal aggregate proﬁts, which is a notorious diﬃculty for models featuring
countercyclical mark ups. In the next section we argue that the sluggish
adjustment in the number of ﬁrms, which is at the basis of the dynamic
correlation path between aggregate output and the price mark up, is key
to address the response of the labor share to a technology shock.
4.2 Productivity shocks and the Labor share
In this section we show that our model with endogenous entry in the
goods market can address the co-movement of labor share with tech-
nology shocks at business cycle frequency. Rios-Rull and Santaeulàlia-
Llopis (2010) estimate the response of the labor share, i.e. the ratio of
the labor compensation to output, to a technology shocks in the US econ-
omy, and ﬁnd it characterized by two main features: countercyclicality
and overshooting.
Explaining both these facts is a notorious diﬃculty for conventional
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20equation (32) simply states that the log-deviation of the labor share is
the diﬀerence between the log-deviation of the real wage and that of
labor productivity. To understand the dynamics of the labor share, we
need to understand the dynamics of these two variables. In a standard
RBC model the real wage is equal to
 
ˆ yt − ˆ Ht
 
, that is, real wages and
labor productivity move identically. Hence, whatever the amount of the
shock, the deviations of the labor share   lst from its steady state is always
zero. Thus, as a general rule, in order to obtain a non constant labor
share the allocative role of the real wage has to be broken.21
In the standard search and matching model the allocative role of
the real wage is broken through Nash bargaining. In response to a
productivity shock real wages jump on impact. Bargaining over wages
implies that only a fraction η of the increase in productivity goes to
workers. As a result ˆ wt − ˆ At < 0 and the labor share is countercyclical
on impact. However, as shown in Figure 3, after peaking on impact the
real wage returns monotonically to its initial level and the labor share
goes back to long run level without overshooting in the benchmark search
model.
In our model, while the labor share is countercyclical for the same
reasons mentioned above, the labor share overshoots its long run value.
This is so under both Bertrand and Cournot competition. Figure 4
shows that the labor share overshoots its long run level after about ﬁve
quarters, it peaks at about the ﬁfth year at a level much larger than its
long-run level and seven years after the shock has hit the economy is still
halfway toward its average. This pattern resembles very closely that in
the data (see Figure 1 of Rios - Rull and Santaeulàlia-Llopis 2010).
The overshooting is related to the dynamic correlation between out-
put and the markup described above. When productivity increases the
markup is muted on impact and gradually decreases as ﬁrms enter into
the market. This pattern is mirrored in the response of the real wage
which peaks after some periods, when the mark up reaches its minimum,
and then reverts to the steady state with a hump shape dynamics. On
the contrary, output jumps on impact and then monotonically reverts
to the steady state. As a result of the hump shaped response of the real
wage, labor income peaks while output is decreasing, leading to the over-
shooting result. The dynamic response of the markup to the technology
21For example, Gomme and Greenwood (1995) break the relationship between
the real wage and productivity augmenting the RBC model with long term labor
contracts, which insure workers againtst income ﬂuctuations. In this case workers
are paid more than the marginal product of labor in bad times, and viceversa, leading
to a countercyclical labor share. Nevertheless, the authors do not tackle the issue of
the overshooting of the labor share.
21shock is thus key for the overshooting.
4.3 Second Moments
To further assess the implications of endogenous market structures for
the business cycle, we compute second moments of the key macroeco-
nomic variables. In this exercise we follow the RBC literature and assume
that the only source of random ﬂuctuations are temporary exogenous
technology shocks. We calibrate the productivity process as in King
and Rebelo (2000), with persistence ρA = 0.979 and standard deviation
σA = 0.0072. We use the same process as in King and Rebelo (2000)
for comparison purposes with the bulk of the literature and to verify the
additional impact of our propagation channel for a given shock.
Table 1 reports statistics on US data for the period 1964:1-2005:1.
We take from Gertler and Trigari (2009) moments relative to output
for consumption C, investment I, the real wage, w, aggregate hours, L,
the unemployment rate, u, the labor market tightness, θ and vacancies
v. Moments for aggregate proﬁts Π, the price mark up  , and job cre-
ation by new entrants, me, are based on our own calculations.22 In the
same Table we report the moments produced by the benchmark search
model and by the two models with competition in quantities and with
competition in prices under the baseline parameterization.23
The two models characterized by endogenous market structure de-
liver a very similar performance at replicating the U.S. business cycle.
The endogeneity of market structures implies a higher volatility of ag-
gregate hours with respect to the benchmark models. This is due to
both a higher volatility of the intensive and extensive margin of labor.24
While unemployment is as volatile as output in the benchmark search
model, it is 4.32 times as volatile as output in our framework. Vacan-
cies perform even better. They are 8.07 times as volatile as output in
both models. Further, both frameworks deliver an extremely volatile
22We consider a labor share-based mark up series as in Rootemberg and Woodford
(1992). See Colciago and Etro (2010) for the details concerning the construction of
this measure. The source for the data on job creation by new entrants is the Business
Employment Dynamics dataset constructed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Data
are releative to job creation by new establishments. Notice that for this variable
data are available from 1992:3. In order to have a longer series, we consider, for this
speciﬁc variable, data up to 2010:3. For consistency, the relative standard deviation
and the contemporaneous correlation with output are computed using real GDP
spanning over the same time period.
23For the computation of the moments concerning the models with endogenous
market structures we consider data-consistent variables. That is, variables have been
deﬂated for the love for variety eﬀect. See BGM (2007) for details.
24The standard deviation of individual hours is 0.22 under both Bertrand and
Cournot competition, while it is 0.03 under the standard search model.
22C I u L w ls θ v me Π  
US. data
Rel.St.Dev. 0.41 2.71 5.15 0.6 0.52 0.51 11.28 6.30 4.34 5.12 0.61
Corr.with Y 0.81 0.94 -0.86 0.78 0.56 -0.20 0.90 0.91 0.26 0.64 -0.26
Baseline Search
Rel.St.Dev. 0.86 1.51 1.28 0.16 0.81 0.02 3.11 2.40 0.00 2.46 0.00
Corr.with Y 0.99 0.99 -0.72 0.99 0.99 -0.98 0.99 0.91 0.00 0.99 0.00
Bertrand Competition
Rel.St.Dev. 0.58 3.37 4.32 0.52 0.47 0.03 10.49 8.07 3.83 0.99 0.02
Corr.with Y 0.98 0.98 -0.73 0.99 0.99 -0.50 0.99 0.90 0.83 0.99 -0.08
Cournot Competition
Rel.St.Dev. 0.56 3.48 4.32 0.53 0.46 0.02 10.48 8.07 3.94 0.99 0.02
Corr.with Y 0.98 0.98 -0.73 0.99 0.99 -0.60 0.99 0.90 0.83 0.99 -0.07
Table 1: Aggregate Statistics
labor market tightness. Indeed, labor market tightness is almost 10.5
times higher than output. Job creation by new ﬁrms displays a relative
volatility in line with that in the data, although the contemporaneous
correlation with output is too high. The volatility of investment is about
three times higher than output in our framework, essentially matching
that in the data. Given the monopolistic competitive nature of the mar-
ket structure, the benchmark search models cannot deliver information
on the volatility of the mark up. On the contrary our models do a rel-
atively good job at matching the negative contemporaneous correlation
between output and the mark up. The relative volatilities of proﬁts and
the mark up are underestimated, however. Finally notice that the real
wages are less volatile than in the benchmark search model and closer to
the data. The contemporaneous correlation with output are also quali-
tatively in line with the data. In particular, the correlation of the labor
share with output is closer to the data in the models with endogenous
entry than in the benchmark search model.
23Considering that we adopt a very standard and conservative model
calibration we see the performance of both the Bertrand and the Cournot
frameworks as a success for three main reasons. First, the model can
reproduce the procyclicality of entry and the countercyclicality of the
mark up observed in the data. Second, it matches the nonlinear time
proﬁle of the correlation between the mark up and the cycle documented
by Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) and emphasized by BGM (2007).
Finally, without resorting to nominal rigidities in wages or prices, it sub-
stantially outperforms a standard model with search in the labor market
in terms of variability of labor market variables. For these reasons we
claim that endogenous market structures are a relevant ampliﬁcation
channel of technology shocks in an otherwise standard model of search
in the labor market.
5 Conclusions
We provided a DSGE model where ﬁrms’ dynamics and matching fric-
tions in the labor market interact endogenously. We accounted for strate-
gic interactions in both prices and quantities among producers. As in
the data, while new ﬁrms account for a relatively small share of overall
employment, they create a relevant fraction of new jobs. The model
explains the procyclicality of proﬁts together with the countercyclicality
of price mark ups and reproduces, at least qualitatively, the behavior of
the labor share in response to a labor productivity shock.
The interplay between search and matching frictions, endogenous en-
try and strategic interactions among producers constitutes a strong am-
pliﬁcation channel of technology shocks on labor market variables. Our
framework outperforms the standard search models in terms of business
cycle statistics of the labor market variables.
Our analysis could be extended in various dimensions. One aspect we
neglect is the asymmetry between market competitors in terms of both
size and the probability of exit form the market. Davis et al. (2009)
document that the distribution of vacancy creation is strongly biased
in favor of small ﬁrms; Haltiwanger et al. (2009) show that younger
ﬁrms are more likely to exit from the market than more mature ﬁrms.
Another important aspect that we do not discuss is, as documented by
Davis et al. (2009), that a large fractions of new hires happens without
prior vacancy creation.
In ongoing research we extend our framework to a government sector
and analyze the transmission of government spending shocks to the labor
market. We believe that the strong propagation embodied in the model
with endogenous market structures could help resolving the unemploy-
ment ﬁscal multiplier puzzle emphasized in some recent contributions
24without departing from a ﬂexible prices approach.
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Figure 1: Impulse response functions to a temporary technology shock.
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Figure 2: Impulse response functions to a temporary technology shock.
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The representative agent maximizes intertemporal utility (2) choosing how
much to invest in bonds and risky stocks out of labor and capital income.
We assume that household invest in both incumbent ﬁrms and new entrants.
Bonds and stocks are denominated in terms of an aggregate price index P A
t .
























=WtLtht + (1 − Lt)P
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where Bt is net bond holdings with interest rate rt, Vkt is the value of an
incumbent ﬁrm in sector k and V e
kt is the value of a new entrant in sector k.
The variables Nkt and Ne
kt represent the number of active ﬁrms in sector k
and the new ﬁrms in this sector at the end of the period. The variable skt is
the share of the stock market value of the incumbent ﬁrms of sector k that
are owned by the agent while se
kt is the share of portfolio of new entrants
held by the household. The term (1 − δ)P A
t
  1
0 [πkt(ε,Nkt) + Vkt]Nkt−1skt
represents the sum between the value of the portfolio of mature incumbent
ﬁrms held by the household and the proﬁts distributed by these ﬁrms. Notice
that in period t there are (1 − δ)Nkt−1 mature incumbent ﬁrms in each sec-










kt denotes the sum
between the value of the portfolio of ﬁrst period incumbent ﬁrms held by the
household and the proﬁts distributed by these ﬁrms, where (1 − δ)Ne
kt−1 is
the number of ﬁrst period producers at time t. Recall that the superscript
FP indicates variables relative to ﬁrst period incumbent ﬁrms. In the budget
constraint we have imposed the condition that V FP
kt = Vkt i.e. symmetry
between incumbents. Finally P A
t Tt represent nominal lump sum taxes im-
posed to ﬁnance unemployment beneﬁts. Equations ?? and 4 represents the
constraint to the utility maximization problem. We denote with ξt the La-
grangian multiplier of the ﬁrst constrain, while Γt is the one of the second
constraint.
The intertemporal optimality conditions with respect to skt+1, se
kt+1 for
each sector, and with respect to Bt+1 are:
31P
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t ξt = βEt(1 + rt+1)P
A
t+1ξt+1
The optimal choice of consumption of the bundle of good produced in sector
k, Ckt, is instead
PktCkt = P
A
t Ct = EXPt for any k ∈ [0,1]
the latter implies that nominal expenditure is identical in each sector and,
given sectors are atomistic with aggregate unit mass, that sector nominal
expenditure equals aggregate nominal expenditure, deﬁned as EXPt. Also,
it follows that ξt = 1
PA
t Ct. Notice that Γt has the meaning of the marginal
value to the household of having a member employed rather than unemployed.










+ βEt [(1 − δ)ρ − zt+1]Γt+1
where wt = Wt
PA
t
is the real wage. Following Ghironi and Melitz (2005), we
adopt a probability δ ∈ [0,1] with which any ﬁrm can exit from the market
for exogenous reasons in each period. The dynamic equation determining the
number of ﬁrms in each sector is then:
Nkt+1 = (1 − δ)(Nkt + N
e
kt) ∀k
which provides the dynamic path for the average number of ﬁrms:





kt)dk = (1 − δ)(Nt + N
e
t )
where, of course, we have Nt ≡
  1





Market clearing in the asset markets requires Bt = 0 for any t in the
bond market, and skt = se
kt = 1 for any sector k in the stock market. In
a symmetric equilibrium, the number of ﬁrms, the mark up and individual




t Ckt = Ct ∀k


















The variable Λt,t+1 = β (1 − δ) Ct
Ct+1 represents the household’s stochastic
discount factor, which takes into account that a ﬁrm exits from the market
with probability δ.
B. Proofs of Propositions
B1. Proposition 1




































Each sector can be similarly described, so we drop the index referring to
sectors and consider a representative sector. Substituting the direct demand











− wt (i)nt (i)ht (i) − kvt (i)















nt (i) = ρnt−1 (i) + vt (i)qt (37)
33Lagrangian multipliers on constraints (36), and (37) are respectively mct (i) and
φt (i). Setting up the Lagrangian L, the FOCs for proﬁt maximization are
∂L
∂nt (i)
= 0 : wt (i)ht (i) + φt (i) − mct (i)Atht (i) = ̺EtΛt,t+1φt+1 (i)
∂L
∂vt (i)



































Notice we assumed that ﬁrms take individual wages as given when choos-
ing employment. Also notice that since there is a continuum of sectors, the
individual ﬁrm takes the aggregate price level as given. The second condition
shows that φt (i), the surplus created by a match, is identical across mature
incumbent ﬁrms. Before providing an explicit formula for the individual price
level and the price mark up, we turn to the proﬁt maximization problem of a
ﬁrst period incumbent producer which sets the price for the ﬁrst time. The
relevant diﬀerence with respect to the previous case is represented by the form
of constraint (37) which reads as vt (i)qt = nt (i), since producers in their
ﬁrst period of activity have no stock initial workforce. However, FOCs with
respect to pt(i), nt (i) and vt (i) are identical to those reported above. Since
the surplus φt created by a match is identical across incumbent ﬁrms, they
will face the same wage bargaining problem, thus will face the same wage,
wt (i) = wt, the same marginal cost, mct (i) = mct, and will demand the

















is the nominal marginal cost, which shows that pt (i)
does not depend on any ﬁrm speciﬁc variable. In other words all incumbent
34ﬁrms, no matter the period of entry, choose the same price. Since ﬁrms face
the same demand function and adopt the same technology, it follows that
yt (i) = yt and nt (i) = nt. We are now ready to provide an expression
for the common price chosen by ﬁrms. Given ﬁrms choose the same price
level, it follows that P A











symmetry and rearranging, condition 3 can be rewritten as







ε(Nt − 1) + 1
(ε − 1)(Nt − 1)
B2. Proposition 2
Proof. The main diﬀerence with the proof of proposition 1 is that proﬁt






















− wt (i)nt (i)ht (i) − kvt (i)
and constraint 36 is replaced by Atnt (i)ht(i) = yt (i). We proceed as above
and initially consider the problem of a mature incumbent. Setting up a La-
grangian function as in the proof of Proposition 1 and diﬀerencing with respect
to yt(i),nt (i),vt (i), it can be easily veriﬁed that the FOCs with respect to
nt (i),vt (i) are unchanged with respect to the Bertrand case. Turning to
the problem of a ﬁrst period incumbent ﬁrm, it can be veriﬁed that the con-
sideration made under Bertrand competition extend to this case. Incumbent
ﬁrms, independently of the period of entry, face the same marginal cost and
assign the same value to the marginal worker. In particular, notice that the























which shows that individual production is not ﬁrms speciﬁc. Imposing sym-

































Proof. Since all incumbent ﬁrms are, under both forms of competition,
characterized by the same size, ﬁrst period incumbent ﬁrms, which have no
initial workforce, must post at time t as many vacancies as required to reach
the size of a mature incumbent producer. Given the time-t workforce of a
ﬁrst period incumbent is vFP











yt − wthtnt − k
nt
qt












yt − wthtnt − kvt
























Proposition 3 implies that
π
NP
t+1 = πt+1 − k
̺nt
qt+1










Notice that the value of an incumbent ﬁrm must satisfy the recursive equation
Vt = EtΛt,t+1 (πt+1 + Vt+1)
Substituting the latter into (40) we obtain equation (19). A similar result
can be obtained combining equations (34) and (33) and using the result in
Proposition 3.
C. Equilibrium Conditions
In what follows we list the equilibrium conditions of the model. The deﬁnition
of aggregate employment is
Lt = Ntnt (41)
Since PtYt = Ntptyt and ρt =
pt
Pt it follows that aggregate output reads as
Yt = ρtNtyt = ρtAtLtht (42)
In equilibrium Bt = Bt−1 = 0 and st = st+1 = se
t+1 = 1. Further since
the Government runs a balanced budget it follows that Gt = b(1 − Lt) = Tt










Good’s market clearing requires
Yt = Ct + N
E


















The motion of the number of ﬁrms reads as







while the dynamic of aggregate employment
















The deﬁnition of the household’s stochastic discount factor is






The wage schedule reads































ε(Nt − 1) + 1
(ε − 1)(Nt − 1)
(55)





(ε − 1)(Nt − 1)
(56)
38Next we have to consider three Euler equations; the one for bonds
1
Ct






that for shares of incumbent ﬁrms
Vt = EtΛt,t+1 (πt+1 + Vt+1) (58)





















and the deﬁnition of proﬁts of incumbent ﬁrms which have been in the market




yt (i) − wtntLt − kvt (i) (61)
The total number of matches is





 1−γ , (62)
where the deﬁnition of the unemployment rate is
ut = 1 − Lt−1 (63)
Finally we have to take into account the entry condition
V
e
t = ψ (64)





The equilibrium contains 24 equations for 25 variables: 24 endogenous
variables Yt, Lt, nt, ht, Ct, mt, qt, zt, θt, Ne




Λt,t+1,  t, rt, Vt, πt, ut, V e
t , ρt and 1 exogenous variable, At. In addition the
equilibrium features 13 parameters: γ, γm, κ, δ, ̺, β, ϕ, χ, η, ε, b, A and
ψ.
39D. Steady State
Given the restrictions reported in the text, the steady state can be obtained
as follows. By deﬁnition q = m
vtot = γmθ
−γ, thus γm = qθ
γ and z = m
u =
γmθ
1−γ. To pin down the steady state rate of unemployment notice that
vtot = θu = θ(1 − L). Substituting for total vacancies into the steady state
counterpart of equation (48) leads to
L=(1 − δ)̺L + qv
tot = (1 − δ)̺L + qθ(1 − L)
=
qθ
1 − (1 − δ)̺ + qθ
As a consequence we can determine
v









1 − (1 − δ)̺






Notice that b = b
ww, where we calibrate the ratio b
w. Evaluating the wage
schedule and the JJC at the steady state leads respectively to
wh =
 
1 − (1 − η)
b
w
 −1  
η
 






wh = mcAh − (1 − ̺(1 − δ)β)
κ
q









1 − (1 − η) b
w













The value of k increasing with the extent of competition since
ρ
  is an in-
creasing function of N. The same holds for the steady state wage, given by
w = mcA − (1 − ̺(1 − δ)β)
κ
hq
Combining the steady state counterparts of equations (43) and (44) delivers












N − (1 − ρ) k
q
L
N, V = 1−Λ
Λ π and πNP =
ψ
Λ − V =
ψ
Λ − Λ
1−Λπ. Substituting the deﬁnitions of π,V and πe into (67) delivers and
equation which can be solved for N. Our numerical analysis shows that the
latter has a unique solution for N>1.
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